A volume in the SUNY series in Philosophy George R. Lucas Jr., editor.

In the broadest sense, Propositionalism is the view that knowing how to do something first requires our possessing appropriate propositional attitudes about an action. Non-propositionalism concerning knowing how, is the rejection of propositionalism. This distinction, and the rejection of propositionalism is typically traced back to Gilbert Ryle. In the 21st century, propositionalists have tried to turn the tables with a quick and decisive argument against non-propositionalism. According to the argument from pervasive inability, since (1) There are numerous cases in which (...) someone knows how to do something while possessing a pervasive inability to perform the action she knows how to do, and (2) these cases can be unproblematically explained to be instances of knowing how by propositionalism, but (3) these cases cannot be explained to be instances of knowing how by non-propositionalism, therefore (4) non-propositionalism must be rejected in favor of propositionalism. In this paper, through a careful examination of proposed cases, I argue that premise two is not true, and by correcting propositionalists’ mischaracterization of non-propositionalism, I argue that premise three is also not true. As a result, the argument from pervasive inability fails to provide a decision between propositionalism and non-propositionalism concerning knowing how. (shrink)

Given Hume’s theory of belief and belief production it is no small task to explain how it is possible for a belief in a miracle to be produced. I argue that belief in a miracle cannot be produced through Hume’s standard causal mechanisms and that although education, passion, and testimony initially seem to be promising mechanisms for producing belief in a miracle, none of these is able to produce the belief in amiracle. I conclude by explaining how this poses a (...) problem for Hume’s theory of belief and I briefly investigate the alternatives available for solving this problem. (shrink)